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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF VERNAL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent} 
-vs.-
UINTAH COUNTY, 
Defendant, 
P. H. LOWE, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
,T_A_LBORG B. T. LOWE, 
Appellant. 
Case Nos. 
7794 and 7795 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement 
of facts only insofar as it is concerned with a descrip-
tion of the location of the tract of land in question, the 
course of legal action taken by the parties, and the facts 
connected with the tax assessments pertaining to the land 
in question. 
Miss Valborg B. T. Lowe at one time owned the prop-
erty in question, consisting of four forty acre tracts as 
appellant states. She mortgaged the property to one 
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I-Ierron who purchased it on foreclosure on December 2, 
1932. (Abstract Entry No. 17.) In 1933 and 19J4 Miss 
Lowe claimed an interest in the land under a lease with 
an option to buy from Herron. On April19, 1934, Herron 
mortgaged the land to the Bank of Vernal which bought 
the land on foreclosure on August 19, 1939 (Tr. 55, 56, 
Abstract of Title Entry 27), the Sheriff's deed to the 
plaintiff Bank being dated March 1, 1940 (Abstract Entry 
No. 32). On May 21, 1945, a tax deed to the land was 
issued by Uintah County to defendant P. H. Lowe (Ab-
stract Entry No. 28) which tax title, as respondent will 
show is fatally defective. 
Defendant grazed stock on the land in question in a 
more or less desultory manner. He grazed sheep at times 
but not even "most of the time" (Tr. 76) and cattle in 
like n1anner (Tr. 76, 77, 103). 
For many years the land in question has been more 
or less fenced. There was a fence in place along the north 
and west sides, at least, twenty five years ago (Tr. 86, 
132, 133, 168). Defendant's sole activity in regard to fenc-
ing the property has been to repair existing fencing (Tr. 
164, et seq.). The present fences are not tight and would 
not turn either sheep or cattle (Tr. 163). Defendant, him-
self, testified to the necessity for herding the stock to 
keep it from straying (Tr. 68). The property is not en-
tirely fenced ( Tr. 184) but opens not only onto defend-
ant's home ranch but also onto other open range land 
(Tr. 186, 187). It is true that Valborg Lowe purchased 
$400.00 worth of wire in one instance as appellants claim; 
however, none of this lot of wire had been used for fenc-
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3 
ing this property at the thne of the trial. Only a portion 
of other 'v-ire 'v-hirh the testin1ony shows 'vas purchased 
by , ... alborg Lo,ve has been used to repair fences on the 
land in question ( Tr. 17 4). 
Defendant did not begin to clain1 the land in question 
as his own until after acquiring the tax deed in 1945 (Tr. 
92, 160) . 
.. A .. ny interest , ... alborg Lowe claimed was through and 
by virtue of her dealings "\Vith Herron and subject to the 
Bank's claim (Tr. 112, 158). Defendant, P. H. Lowe, 
knew that his sister, \ ... alborg Lowe, claimed the land 
and that she claimed it by reason of an agreement with 
Herron subject to the lien of the Bank ( Tr. 112). The 
sole 'vay in which he claimed an interest was through 
his sister; i.e., if his sister had an interest he then claimed 
an interest in that belonging to her (Tr. 113). Valborg 
Lowe claimed the land in question and the sheep men-
tioned as grazing thereon as her assets in debtor's relief 
in 1940. P. H. Lowe knew she had done so and made no 
objection (Tr. 117). 
At various times officers of plaintiff Bank were on 
the land in question for the purpose of talking to P. H. 
Lowe and Valborg Lowe about the land in question and 
the financial obligations of the Lowes in re·gard thereto 
(Tr. 107, 148, 149, 161). P. H. Lowe saw three of the 
Bank's officers at his home immediately adjoining the 
tract in question in 1940 (Tr. 107). In 1940 he also saw 
a Mr. Stahler representing the sheriff of Uintah County 
at his horne and knew that Mr. Stahler had come to take 
certain sheep into custody (Tr. 108). N. J. Meagher, as 
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cashier of plaintiff Bank was on the land in 1940 at which 
ti1ne the Bank held title to the land (Tr. 148). He had 
Inany conversations with Valborg Lowe relative to the 
land in question and her interest therein from 1933 on 
( Tr. 156 et seq.). In each instance the interest claimed 
by \ralborg Lowe was that acquired under an agreement 
\vith Herron and subject to the Bank's mortgage. Also 
at each instance she made it clear that she was dealing 
\vith the Bank on her own behalf, not for her brother (Tr. 
159). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
II. 
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT AS TO DEFEND-
ANT P. H. LOWE'S CROSS-COMPLAINT, SAID P. H. LOWE 
HAS NO CLAIM OR INTEREST OR ESTATE IN SAID 
PROPERTY AND IS WITHOUT ANY RIGHT WHATEVER, 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UP-
HELD. 
III. 
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT IT IS TRUE 
THAT PLAINTIFF BANK OF VERNAL AND ITS PREDE-
CESSORS IN TITLE AND INTEREST ARE NOW AND HAVE 
BEEN IN THE ACTUAL POSSESSION TO THE ABOVE 
DESCRIBED LANDS FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION AND 
HAS BEEN SEIZED AND IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
OF THE SAME, IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
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IV. 
THAT THE JUDGMENT AGAINST VALBORG B. T. 
LOWE IS ENTIRELY PROPER INASMUCH AS SHE WAS 
MADE A PARTY DEFENDANT BY STIPULATION OF THE 
PARTIES AND SHOULD BE UPHELD . 
. A.R.G lT~IENT 
I. 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
This is a suit to quiet title to certain land and as such 
it is an equitable action, 5 Pomeroy, Equity J urispru-
dence, 485'; 44 _._\m. Juris. 333. 
Justice Wade, speaking in the recent Utah case of 
Migliaccio /c. Da.vis, ( J nne 8, 1951) says : 
"Since in law actions there is no appeal to this 
court on questions of fact, and even in equity cases 
we do not disturb the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are manifestly contrary to the weight 
of the evidence, to thus nullify such findings is 
contrary to any recognized practice in this state." 
Justice Wade further stated that the findings of fact 
must be upheld if such facts can be reasonably found 
from the evidence, or are not manifestly contrary thereto. 
The trial court is in a position to evaluate the evi-
dence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. To add 
further strength to this p-oint, in the case under consider-
ation the court viewed the premises as is shown on the 
record (Tr. 170). 
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From the foregoing it appears that if there is evi-
dence in the record from which the findings of fact made 
by the trial court could reasonably be found, then they 
should be upheld. In the present case there is ample 
evidence to support each and every finding of fact made 
by the trial court. 
No question has been raised as to findings of fact 
numbers one through four relating to the chain of title 
to the land in question. 
Appellants have attacked the findings of fact upon 
the grounds that the title to the land should be quieted 
in defendant P. H. Lowe on the basis of adverse posses-
sion; that the claim of plaintiff, Bank of Vernal, is barred 
by the statute of limitations; and that as to appellant 
V alborg Lowe, the decree granted by the trial court 
should be dismissed for the reason that she was not a 
party defendant. These points of attack respondent will 
consider in order. 
II. 
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT AS TO DEFEND-
ANT P. H. LOWE'S CROSS-COMPLAINT, SAID P. H. LOWE 
HAS NO CLAIM OR INTEREST OR ESTATE IN SAID 
PROPERTY AND IS WITHOUT ANY RIGHT WHATEVER, 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UP-
HELD. 
The Statutes of Utah regarding adverse possession 
require that the property: 
(1) be protected by a substantial enclosure, 
(2) be usually cultivated or improved, 
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(3) have labor or n1oney expended upon da1ns, 
canals, en1banlnnents, aqueducts or other,vise for the pur-
pose of irrigating such lands an1ounting to the sum of 
$5.00 per acre. (Session La \\~S of Utah, section 104-12-11, 
ch. 58, p. 183). 
( 4) The land n1ust have been occupied and claimed 
for seven years continuously and the claiinant, his pre-
decessors and grantors must have paid all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land according 
to law. (Session la"~s of Utah, section 104-12-12, ch. 58, p. 
183). 
(5) The possession 1nust have been for the whole 
period, actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous and 
hostile to the true owner's title and under claim of right 
or color of title. 1 Am. Jur. 793. 
Defendant P. H. Lowe has not established a claim 
by adverse possession under the above provisions. 
SUBSTANTIAL ENC·LOSURE 
Defendant has not effected a substantial enclosure of 
the property in question. The act of enclosure is import-
ant, among other reasons, as an indication of possession. 
1 Am. Juris. 869. In the present instance the fences which 
are in position were not erected by defendant; but, in 
fact, were built at least twenty five years ago (Tr. 86). 
There is clear evidence that the land was fenced along 
the highway and west sides many years ago (Tr. 86, 133, 
168). The fences have never been tight along the east side 
of the tract, and even the south side, is not completely 
fenced (Tr. 184, 186, 187). Valborg Lowe testified that 
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the land was already fenced in 1917 (Tr. 132) and that 
there have always been the same fencelines (Tr. 133). 
The only evidence as to fencing was that there was a 
eertain amount of repair of existing fences but there is 
ahsolutely no evidence of the erection of new boundary 
fences which would act as a substantial enclosure of land 
claimed. 
The lack of any evidence regarding the enclosing of 
the property by the defendant is so marked that we ac-
tually find the following statement made by defendant's 
counsel in reply to a question by the court. 
"THE COURT: And wasn't any intent on 
your part to show that any expenditure had been 
made by him or any fence had been put up by 
him~ 
"MR. CLAWSON: That is correct, sir." 
According to defendant's own testimony all he has 
done in respect to protecting the property by a substan-
tial enclosure was to put in "a few posts" and make re-
pairs once in awhile ( Tr. 164). Defendant's statement 
that he put up 60 rods of wire in 1948 can not he con-
sidered since it apparently was done after this action was 
commenced (Tr. 165, 166). Defendant's testimony as to 
setting an additional twenty five posts must also be dis-
regarded since this was done a full three years after the 
commencement of this action (Tr. 166). There was some 
testimony to the effect that Valborg Lowe purchased wire 
for fencing but as of the time of the trial in 1951, it had 
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not been used and 'vas, in fact, still in rolls on the Lowe 
hon1e ranch (Tr. 17~, 174). 
Since no ne'v fencing has been erected, no notice or 
evidence of defendant's possession is given by "en-
closure." 
The enclosing of land by another will not give a 
claimant the right to the land by adverse possession as 
shown in the case of Peterson -~·. Johnson, 84 Utah, 89, 
34 Pac. (2d) 697, which was an action to establish title to 
property in 'vhich defendant claimed title by adverse pos-
session. It "\Yas decided that evidence that claimant's pre-
decessors enclosed within a fence a strip of land not 
covered by the defendant's deed and that such fence had 
been maintained for a long period of time did not vest 
title to such land in the claimant. 
It has been decided in Utah that enclosure of the 
land is essential in establishing adverse possession in a 
case such as tllis. In the case of Central Pac. Ry. v. Tar-
pey et al, 51 1I tah 107, 168 Pac., 554, 556, 1 A.L.R. 1319, 
the court stated: 
"But where the claim of title is not founded 
upon a written instrument but is based entirely 
upon actual possession of every part of the land, 
the requirement that the land be protected by a 
substantial enclosure, or that it has been usually 
cultivated or improved, or money expended upon 
it for irrigation as provided in that section is im-
perative by necessity." 
There is here no claim of cultivation or improvement 
of the land or money expended for irrigation; therefore, 
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proof of substantial enclosure must appear conclusively 
to support defendant's claim. 
Where enclosure is essential or relied upon as evi-
dence of possession it must be complete and so open and 
notorious as to charge the owner with knowledge there-
of. 1 Am. Juris. 869. As shown above, defendant did no 
1nore than make repairs to existing fences so there can 
be no contention that the enclosing was so open and 
notorious as to charge plaintiff with notice. 
The enclosure of the tract in question was not com-
plete. No fence had ever been erected along the lower 
east boundary ( Tr. 184). The mere fact that the tract 
in question adjoins the home ranch of the defendant on 
the east is no excuse or reason to ignore the fact that the 
land claimed by adverse possession was not enclosed 
along that side. As the court said in the case of Central 
Pac. Ry. et al. v. Tarpey, supra, the land claimed by ad-
verse. possession must be completely enclosed to establish 
the exact boundaries of the property claimed, among · 
other reasons. The tract in question opens not only onto 
the horne ranch of P. H. Lowe but also directly onto open 
range land ( Tr. 1'86, 187). This makes the so-called en-
closure far from complete. Thus we see that the enclosure 
claimed by defendant to establish his claim by adverse 
possession lacks two of the essential features, that it be 
so open and notorious as to give notice of claimant's 
possession and that it be complete. 
Such fences as are in position on the land are neither 
substantial nor tight. The Utah Court in the, Central Pac. 
v. Tarpey case specifically stated that the imperative 
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necessity 'vas a substantial Enclosure. On this point P. 
H. Lo,ve testified as to fence posts: 
"•So1ne are fifteen and some are about thirty 
(feet), I guess. Supposed to be another post in 
bet,veen" (Tr. 87). 
Certainly this cannot be considered a tight fence or a 
substantial one. 
N. J. Meagher testified that he is and has been per-
sonally acquainted 'vith the tract and the fences thereon 
and that they are and have been in very poor condition 
and would not turn either sheep or cattle (Tr. 163). The 
very description of the fences as testified to (Tr. 61, 62, 
63) as simply two strands of barbed wire indicates any-
thing but a tight, substantial fence. 
P. H. Lowe testified that the land was used solely to 
pasture sheep and cattle (Tr. 67, 74). He further stated 
that when the sheep were on at least part of the tract he 
had to herd them all the time although on fenced land 
this was unnecessary (Tr. 68). It is well settled that the 
enclosure should be appropriate to fit the premises for 
the use to which the occupant desired to put them. 1 Am. 
Juris. 870. Clearly, if these fences are not such as would 
turn stock, are so poor that the stock must be constantly 
herded when the land is to be used only for grazing, and, 
further do not completely enclose the property, they do 
not fulfill the requirements of the statutes. 
CONTINUOUS USE 
The land must have been occupied and claimed con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
tinuously for seven years. (Session Laws of Utah, 104-
12-12). 
Since this land was not residential property, the oc-
cupation thereof must be based upon the use to which it 
was put. Defendant testified that it was used only for 
pasture and grazing for sheep and cattle (Tr. 74) but he 
did not graze sheep there all the ~ti~e (Tr. 75). P. H. 
Lowe testified as to sheep: 
"Q. Do you have some of them down there all the 
time~ 
A. No, not all the time. 
Q. Most of the time~ 
A. No, I wouldn't say most of the time." (Tr. 76) 
and later: 
"Q. Are the cattle down there all the time~ 
A. No, not all the time. 
Q. Not all the time~ 
A. No. 
Q. Most of the time~ 
A. No. 
Q. What part of the time~ 
A. Well mostly during the summer be a few 
there." (Tr. 76, 77). 
P. H. Lowe again testified that cattle did not graze 
continually on the tract in question (Tr. 103). 
Since the property in question was contiguous to the 
Lowe horne ranch merely normal husbandry would have 
used the property most of the year. 
Apparently, inasmuch as the land was used by appel-
, 
lant solely for grazing sheep and cattle, a good part of 
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the tilne it 'vas not used by appellant at all since he did 
not use it even Hinost of the ti1ne" for pasturing either 
sheep or cattle ..... \s long as the land was not used, it wa~ 
not occupied; therefore it "~as not ~'occupied ... for seven 
years continuously" as required by statute. 
COXTINlTOt'"S CLAinl 
Appellant did not claiin the land for seven years 
continuously as required. P. H. Lowe specifically testi-
fied that he did not begin to claim the land as his own 
until after he bought the tax title from Uintah County on 
~Iay ~1, 1945, and that he did not begin to run sheep 
on the land as his o"""ll until 1945, ( Tr. 92) only three 
years before this action was commenced. P. H. Lowe's 
own statement as to his claim to the land prior to 1945 
'vas: '~Oh, I figured more or less right to it. Always had. 
Just as much as anybody else." (Tr. 95). In addition, 
P. H. Lowe stated that he "didn't exactly claim all of it." 
(Tr. 93). This certainly cannot be construed as an ex-
clusive claim to the land nor is it hostile to the true owner 
as the law requires. 
Adverse possession consists not simply of posses-
sion but of a possession by the occupier claiming the land 
as his own and denying the right of everybody else. Wren 
v. Parker, 57 Conn. 547, 18A. 790 6 L.R.A. 80. 
Appellant himself had never even ordered anyone 
else to stay off the land (Tr. 95). 
It appears from the cumulative testimony of the 
various witnesses that the appellant, P. H. Lowe, never 
did really claim the land as his. What tenuous claim was 
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14 
made appeared to be by appellant's sister, Valborg Lowe. 
Even in 1945 when the tax title to the land was pur-
chased from Uintah County, it was Miss Lowe who ap-
peared before the Board of County Supervisors in reL.. 
gard to the purchase ( Tr. 106, 114, 144). P. H. Lowe 
testified that his sister does not now own any of the 
land in question (Tr. 90), but Miss Lowe paid taxes with 
a check drawn on the Lowe Ranch, which account was set 
up about 1946. Miss Lowe claimed the land among her 
assets in debtor's relief, her brother knew she had, and 
made no objection (Tr. 117). N.J. Meagher testified that 
he had various dealings with Miss Lowe in which she 
always made it clear that she was acting on her own be-
half and not for her brother (Tr. 159, 160, 161). This 
clearly refutes any such claim (by defendant) so open 
and notorious as to give notice to the true owner. There 
was not even any agreement between the Lowes as to 
who actually owned the stock which grazed on the land 
in question from time to time (Tr. 78, 80, 83, 85, 89). 
V alborg Lowe sold the wool and paid taxes on the sheep 
as a rule and· the sheep now owned by the Lowes are the 
increase from those V alborg claimed as assets in debtor's 
relief ( Tr. 83, 84, 90, 116, 141). 
P. H. Lowe clearly stated that in 1940 he knew that 
V alborg Lowe claimed the land in question, that she 
claimed it subject to the lie.n of the Ba,nk of Verndl, and 
tha.t she claimed it by reason of an agreement with 
Herron (Tr. 112). P. H. Lowe stated that the sole claim 
he made to the land was through his sister; i.e, if his 
sister had an interest, then he claimed an interest in hers, 
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(Tr. 113). N. J. ~Ieagher, an officer of plaintiff Bank, 
stated that never to his kno"\\"ledge did P. H. Lowe clai1n 
any interest in the land prior to the tax sale in 1~)-l-5 (rrr. 
160) . 
.... \ppellants seen1 to be atte1npting to attach too many 
strings to their bow; that is, they are basing their claim 
to the property in the first instance upon the exclusive 
clain1 of P. H. Lo,ve, then turn to Valborg Lowe, the 
sister, and, in effect say, ·',veil, if P. H. Lowe does not 
claim exclusive possession, then his sister does." There 
is no showing of a privity interest by the two appellants 
so this attempted alternative stand is obviously unten-
able. Respondent, of course, applies all arguments con-
tained herein and directed against the defendant, P. H. 
Lowe; also, and with equal force to the defendant, Val-
borg B. T. Lowe. In other words, any claim of the defend-
ant, ·v·alborg B. T. Lowe, fails equally with any claim 
of the defendant, P. H. Lowe, as hereinabove noted. 
The indefinite and confusing nature of the claims 
made and the conflicting testimony relating thereto com-
pletely negates any exclusive nature in the defendant's 
claim to the land thus showing the lack of one of the 
essentials set forth in Wren v. Parker, supra. 
PAYMENT OF TAXES 
Appellants insist that they gained additional 
strength to their claim by virtue of the fact that the re-
spondent Bank did not pay taxes on the land in question. 
However, the inconsistency of appellant's position is 
obvious when it is noted that they go to great lengths 
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to show that no taxes were legally assessed upon the 
land in question during the period 1928 to 1946, inclusive. 
Appellants do this to remove themselves from the 
statutory requirement that one claiming land by adverse 
possession must have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to the law, 
since they are in the position of not having paid the taxes 
for any seven year period. It was stipulated that the taxes 
from 1928 to 1946 inclusive were not legally assessed, 
inasmuch as the required auditor's certificates were not 
attached to the rolls (Tr. 56, 57, 58). If the taxes were not 
levied according to law as to appellants then certainly 
they were not levied according to law as to respondents; 
therefore, this argument does nothing to advance appel-
lants' claim. Appellants cannot in justice or reason main-
tain one stand for themselves and another for respond-
ents upon the same question. 
ACTUAL, OPEN, VISIBLE, NOTORIOUS HOSTILE 
POSSESSION 
Appellant did not show the required actual, open, vis-
ible and continuous possession (1 A.m. Juris. 795) as 
respondent has shown by the foregoing, since the evidence 
set forth shows that the sole possession which could pos-
sibly be claimed was the intermittent grazing of stock 
without the addition of so much as a new fence to make 
possession actual, open, or visible. 
Appellant, P. H. Lowe, did not show any notorious 
possession by him. The only evidence even remotely per-
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tinent to this point 'vas given by one single witness and 
he 8tated that the general opinion was that Valborg 
Lowe, the sister, rather than P. H. Lowe, owned it al-
though P. H. Lo,ve stated his sister did not own any inter-
est in the land thus completely contradicting his own one 
'vitness on this point (Tr. 90, 131). The testimony of one 
w·itness, tmder the circun1stances does not show notorious 
possession. The very purpose of the requirement that the 
possession be open and notorious is to give notice to the 
true owner of possession of his lands by another claiming 
to own them bona fide and openly. In the absence of ac-
tual notice to the owner the possession of the adverse 
claimant must be so open, notorious and visible that the 
owner must have known of it as a reasonable man. 1 Am. 
Juris. 874, 875, Annotation, 15 L.R.A. (NS) 1178, 1200. 
Here no such possession was shown . 
.... -\.ppellants did not show possession hostile to the true 
owner's title. It is perfectly true that the term "hostile" 
as used in regard to the adverse possession of land does 
not impart enmity or ill will as appellant carefully point-
ed out. He cites many cases to this effect with all of which 
we agree. They are not adverse to respondent's case, but 
rather, tend to aid it. The word "hostile" means that the 
one in possession of land claims the exclusive right there-
to and imports a denial of the owner's title. 1 Am. Juris. 
872, Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, 37 Ut. 334, 90 Pac. 
564, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 627. Bradbury Marble Co. v. Lac-
lede Gaslight Co., 106 S.W. 594, 599, 128 Mo. App. 96-
"Hostile"means opposed to and antagonistic to the claims 
of all others. "Hostile" means a holding possession claim-
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ing to hold against all other claimants. Taylor v. Hover, 
108 N.W. 149, 150, 77 Neb. 97. 
In the case at hand P. H. Lowe clearly stated that he 
only felt he had as much right as anyone else (Tr. 95) 
and "didn't exactly claim all of it" (Tr. 93). He further 
testified that his only claim to the land was an interest 
in his sister's interest, if she had any (Tr. 113) and that 
he knew his sister claimed the land by virtue of an agree-
ment with Herron subject to the lien of the respondent 
Bank ( Tr. 112). As to any notice, actual or constructive 
to respondent Bank, the true owner, N. J. Meagher testi-
fied that he called upon appellants many times to discuss 
their obligations in regard to the property after 1933, 
(Tr. 161) in a manner which clearly indicates a lack of 
notice by respondent. 
From the foregoing it plainly appears that what 
testimony appellants presented was conflicting and did 
not support a claim to actual, open, notorious, visible 
or hostile possession by P. H. Lowe. 
It is true that P. H. Lowe bought the tax title to the 
land in 1945. This tax title was invalid as against the 
real owner, respondent Bank of Vernal. By stipulation 
of the parties (Tr. 56), it appears that no auditor's certi-
ficate was attached to the tax rolls of Uintah County from 
1928 to 1946 inclusive. Such a defect in the required tax 
procedure will invalidate the tax deed subsequently is-
sued as against the true owner. Toronto v. Sheffield, 222 
P. ( 2d) 57 4, 602 (U t. 1950) concurring opinion : 
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hit is a rare case indeed where a search of the 
tax procedure 'vill not disclose somewhere along 
the line one or n1ore infirmities of commission or 
o1nmission in the tax procedure. And almost every 
type of such infermity has been held to be an in-
fermity \vhich transcends the level of an informal-
ity in an act relating to assessment or collection of 
taxes." 
Utah still adheres to the rule of strictissimi juris not 
'vithstanding Section 80-11-7 to the Code. See discussion 
Ut Lau~ Review Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 105. Consequently, the 
defects in procedure leading to the tax deed invalidates 
it. Telonis c. Staley, 104 Ut. 537, 144 P. (2d) 537. Equit-
able Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Schoewe, 105 Ut. 569, 
144 P. (2d) 526. 
As we have shown appellant has not supported any 
valid claim to the property in question by virtue of ad-
verse possession. 
There is a great deal of evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's findings of fact that the title 
of plaintiff Bank of Vernal is good and sufficient and 
that appellants P. H. Lowe, Valborg B .T. Lowe or any 
other person, known or unknown, have no right, title, in-
terest, claim or estate in and to said land. 
III. 
THAT THE FINDING OF FACT THAT IT IS TRUE 
THAT PLAINTIFF BANK OF VERNAL AND ITS PREDE-
CESSORS IN TITLE AND INTEREST ARE NOW AND HAVE 
BEEN IN THE ACTUAL POSSESSION TO THE ABOVE 
DESCRIBED LANDS FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION AND 
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HAS BEEN SEIZED AND IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
OF THE SAME, IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD BE UPHE-LD. 
Appellant contends that respondent's right to main-
tain this action is barred by the statute of limitations. 
The pertinent provisions of our Code are: 
Revised Statutes of Utah 104-2-5: 
"No action for recovery of real property or 
the possession thereof shall be maintained ~ 
it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestotor pre-
decessor #! interest was seized or possessed of 
the property in question within seven years before 
commencement of the action." 
Revised Statutes of Utah 104-2-7: Possession presumed 
-. 1n owner: 
"In every action for recovery of real property 
·or the possession thereof, the person establishing 
a legal title to the property shall be presumed to 
have been possessed thereof within the time re-
quired by law; and the occupation of the property 
by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title, un-
less it appears that the property has been held 
and possessed adversely to such legal title for 
seven years before the commencement of the ac-
tion." 
Here plaintiff is clearly the owner of the legal title 
to the land as shown by the Abstract of Title, plaintiff's 
Exhibit A (Tr. 5) and finding of fact numbers two and 
three. Appellants do not question this. As we have here· 
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tofore shown, P. H. Lo\ve's purchase of the tax title in 
1945 did not disturb plaintiff's legal title. 
In the case of Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131, 138 
Pac. 1169, the court said: 
H_ • .-\.11 presumption that obtains under this 
section that defendant's possession was 'in sub-
ordination to the legal title' continues until it is 
overcome by clear pToof that defendant's posses-
sion \vas adverse to such title." 
In this case there is absolutely no "clear proof that 
defendant's possession was adverse to such title." On the 
contrary, the testimony of the defendant shows a decided 
lack of any proof of adverse possession. Since the evi-
dence clearly shows that there was no adverse possession 
for seven years before the commencement of this action 
and the plain tiff is the holder of the legal title to the 
property, the presumption that plaintiff was in posses-
sion of the property has not been rebutted and should be 
given full effect. Plaintiff then being presumed to have 
been in possession is not barred by the statute of limit-
ations from maintaining this action. 
Plaintiff's stand on this point is based not only on 
the above discussed presumption, but also upon further 
affirmative evidence. 
P. H. Lowe was asked whether he had seen either 
N. J. Meagher or C. W. Showalter, officers of plaintiff 
Bank, on the land in 1940. Rather than answer unequi-
vocally, he could only say, "I don't remember." He testi-
fied that he did not know Mr. Showalter so, admittedly, 
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would not know whether he had been there or not. In the 
next instance, however, he did clearly state that he saw 
these two men, together with Willis L. Johnson, then 
president of plaintiff Bank, at his home adjoining the 
property in question in 1940 ( Tr. 107). The testimony 
of defendant P. H. Lowe being contradictory as to itself 
should not be given effect in overruling the trial court's 
finding of fact. 
N. J. Meagher, as cashier of the Bank was on the land 
in question in 1940 at which time the Bank held legal 
title to the land (Tr. 148). He had a great many conver-
sations with Valborg Lowe in the presence of P. H. Lowe 
relative to the land in question and her interest in it sub-
sequent to 1933 (Tr. 148, 149, 156 et seq.). 
Appellants contend that the word "seized" as used in 
the statutory term "seized or possessed of the property" 
means nothing more or less than actual possession of the 
property in question. This could not be so for obvious 
reasons. Could it seriously be considered for a moment 
that a landlord who had rented or leased his property 
could not maintain an action for the recovery thereof~ 
That in effect, is what appellants assert. If appellants' 
stand were to be set up as a rule, there could be no land-
lord-tenant relationship nor could a man own more than 
one parcel of property or property at a distance from 
his home since he could not be in actual possession of such 
property at all times and he would be in the untenable 
position of not being able to protect his rights in such 
property. 
There are many cases which state that the word 
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Hseized~' means something other than actual physical 
possession. In South End Mining Co. v. Tinney, 35 Pac. 
~~1, ~)-±, 22 Nev. 19, the court said: 
"'The 'vord ~seized' as relating to a mine or 
claim means something different from simple 
possession of a claim or a holding of it in accord-
ance "'\vith the la,vs and customs of miners. It 
means, as it "'\vould naturally import, an ownership 
in fee for this is the only ownership known to the 
law." 
In Burdett l;. Burdett, 109 Pac. 922, 926, 26 Okla. 416, 
35 L.R.A. ( NS) 964, the court said, "Seized means 'ti tie' 
or 'o,vnership' which carries with it the right of posses-
sion." In Grant v. Hathaway, 96 S.W. 417, 118 Mo. App. 
604, the Court said that the word "seized" used in the same 
manner as in the Utah statute under consideration means 
possession and ownership. The Washington Supreme 
Court held that the rightful owner of land not in the ac-
tual, proved adverse possession of another is "seized" 
thereof within the meaning of the term "seized or pos-
sessed" in the Washington statute of limitations on ac-
tions to recover real property. Balc·h v. Smith, 30 Pac. 
648, 649, 4 Wash. 497. In Loring v. Arnold, 8A. 335, 15 
R. Q. 428, the word "seized" was defined as meaning 
"have." 
From the foregoing it is apparent that plaintiff Bank 
was "seized" of the property in question for seven years 
before the commencement of this action and not, there-
fore, barred by the statute of limitations. 
The question raised by appellant as to whether the 
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sion could have no effect upon the case at hand since 
plaintiff was clearly seized of the property within the 
-crucial time. However, it was shown in Sheppick v. Shep-
pick, supra, that appellants' contention is not sound. It 
is there stated that the presumption of the plaintiff's 
possession continues until "clear proof that deferidant's 
possession was adverse to such title." The question of 
adverse possession appears, therefore, to be an essential 
in this particular application of the statute of limitations. 
It is perfectly true that the statute of limitations applies 
to actions in which the element of adverse possession is 
completely absent, but it is equally true that in an action 
such as the one under consideration, the element of 
proved adverse possession is involved. In Balch v. Smith, 
supra, the Washington Supreme Court was dealing with 
a statute of limitations containing the same terms and 
provisions as the Utah Statute, and found it necessary 
to include the problem of adverse possession in the de-
cision of the limitation question. 
There is ample evidence, both direct and by pre-
sumption, to support the trial court's finding of fact to 
the effect that plaintiff's action is not barred by the stat-
ute of limitations; therefore it should be upheld. 
IV. 
THAT THE JUDGMENT AGAINST V ALBORG B. T. 
LOWE IS ENTIRELY PROPER INASMUCH AS SHE WAS 
MADE A PARTY DEFENDANT BY STIPULATION OF THE 
PARTIES AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
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\ ... alborg B. T. Lo,ve 'Yas n1ade a party defendant by 
~tipulation in the proceedings (Tr. 128) . 
.... \ppellanfs attorney requested the joinder of \Tal-
borg Lo,ve. 
'~:JIR. CL ... ~ WSON: Now this is somewhat 
irregular, if the court please, but so that the whole 
thing n1ay be before the court, I would like to ask 
the "~itness if she is agreeable at this time to be 
made a party, so that 've 'von't have anything held 
in abeyance. 
H ~IR. JOHNSON: No objection to it. 
HTHE COURT: You may proceed." 
Utah Rules of C·ivil Procedure Rule 20 (a) 
~~Permissive Joinder of Par~e~s..:. _J\J~ yersons 
n1ay be joined.. in one action a~f tlMwe~ 
is: assert~ agai!H)t them t.iointly, severally, or ill 
the alternative~Jany right to relie~ respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will 
arise in the action ... Judgment may be given for 
one or more of the plaintiff's according to their re-
~pective rights to relief and against one or more 
defendants according to their respective liabili-
ties." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 21 :Misjoinder and 
Non-Joinder of Parties: 
~'~lisjoinder of parties is not ground for dis-
missal of an action. Parties may be dropped or 
added by order of the court on motion of any 
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party or of its own initiative at any stage of the 
action and on such terms as are just. Any claim 
against a party may be severed and proceeded 
with separately." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 22: Int~rpleader. 
"Persons having claims against the plaintiff 
may be joined as defendants and required to in-
terplead when their claims are such that the 
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multi-
ple liability. It is not ground for objection~! to 
the joinder that the claims of the several claimants 
or the titles on which their claims depend do not 
have a common origin or are not identical but are 
adverse to and independent, of one another, or 
that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in 
whole or in part to any or all of the claimants .... 
The provisions of this rule supplement and do not 
in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted 
in Rule 20." 
The joinder of defendant, P. H. Lowe's sister, Val-
borg B. T. Lowe, is clearly permissable under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure as above quoted inasmuch as it 
appears from the testimony that she may claim an in-
terest in the land in question; consequently, the joinder 
of Valborg Lowe, by stipulation as was done was en-
tirely proper and she thereby became a party to the ac-
tion. Since Miss Lowe did become a party, the case of 
Houser v. s·mith, 19 Utah 150, 56 Pac. 683, cited by ap-
pellant is not in point. The trial court did have juris-
diction to render its judgment as against Miss Lowe and 
its judgment should stand. 
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Appellants make various assertions which have no 
bearing upon the n1erits of the case. They state that 
plaintiff Bank purchased the land in question on fore-
closure for the sum of only $1.00. The amount paid by 
the plaintiff is clearly beyond the issues, and, for that 
matter, the defendant could have redeemed the land for 
only $1.00 had he felt the desire to do so. Appellants 
state that the plaintiff is activated by the desire to gain 
whatever wealth oil 'vill bring. This, of course, has abso-
lutely no bearing on the question of the rights of the par-
ties in the land. The motives of either party can have no 
relation to the merits of their respective claims. Why 
either respondent or appellant desires a particular pur-
pose or reason is absolutely immaterial. 
The respondent wishes forcefully to inm·ite the atten-
tion of this honorable court to the fact that the trial judge 
viewed the premises with which we are here concerned. 
In addition to being in a position to observe and evaluate 
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony, the 
trial court gained first hand know·ledge of the prop·erty 
itself. The trial judge was able to see for himself the 
condition of the fences on the property in question and to 
determine whether the fences were such as to constitute 
a "substantial enclosure" as required by Utah law. It is, 
therefore submitted that the trial court was in the best 
possible position to make proper findings of fact with 
respect to the adverse possession urged by appellants. 
It is submitted that the findings of fact of the trial 
court should be upheld in each instance inasmuch as they 
are amply sup·ported by testimony and other evidence 
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adduced at the trial. They are not "manifestly contrary 
to the evidence" within the meaning of Migliaccio v. 
Davis, supra and come within the doctrine expressed in 
that case to the effect that under such circumstances the 
trial court's findings of fact should be upheld and not 
disturbed, and the decree based thereon sustained. 
LEE NEFF TAYLOR, 
CLYDE S. JOHNSON, 
F. A. LINSLEY, 
EDWARD G. LINSLEY, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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